New Delhi: China’s Biosecurity Law is all set to be effected on April 15, 2021, the day China observes its National Security Education Day. The stated objective of the law is to strengthen regulations on the conduct of biotechnology research and development activities in China. However, the timing of the announcement of such a law at this juncture of time, when the world is still struggling to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, is sufficient enough to raise doubts that whether this law is a by-product of the criticism China has been facing for being the origin of the virus.
The law has already been approved by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress back in October 2020. Lingering its enactment for as long as 6 months post-approval, in contrast to swift effecting the New Defence Law within a week of its approval on December 26, also seems deceptive. If China really needs this long gestation period for the enactment of its Biosecurity Law, it implies that either there was almost no biosecurity system in place beforehand or there are certainly other things to clean up.
Under the Biosecurity Law, lab animals have been prohibited to enter the market. This again raises the question of whether the law is intended to prevent the possibility of spread of infections through these animals or a cover-up to a bio-disaster caused by some random sale of such lab animals in the markets of Wuhan.
Amidst these doubts, the only certainty is that the law would further fortify the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its General Secretary, President Xi Jinping. Through this law, biosecurity has been included in the National Security System and the National Security Commission (NSC) would be responsible for the establishment of biosecurity management systems. With NSC being under the direct command of Xi Jinping, the entire biosecurity management would come under his control.
Moreover, China emphasizes that it has sovereignty over its people and instructs the State Council’s Science and Technology departments to conduct an investigation on human genetic resources. Though some restrictions have been put on collecting genetic resources, the investigation of “crimes” and “illegal activities’ have been exempted from this rule. As it is widely known that anything in China that is contrary to the ideology of CCP is considered as a crime and illegal, such exemptions are bound to be used against Xi’s detractors and they are now open to the threat of becoming guinea pigs of China’s biotechnology research and development activities.
The biotechnology research and development activities have been classified into high-risk, medium-risk and low-risk categories. The law further establishes a retroactive management system, under which each entity is required to record with the relevant authority any purchase or import of controlled essential equipment and special biological agents. The penalties for defiance vary from the imposition of fines of Yuan 41-10 million to debarment from engaging in biotechnology research for 10 years or for life. This indicates that only those, who are loyal to Xi Jinping, would be allowed to practice biotechnology researches and those defying him at a later stage would be subjected to punishment in accordance to the extent of their defiance. The gestation period for the enactment of the law would possibly be used for placing Xi’s loyalists in the order of the envisioned Biosecurity system under the law.
Another obvious objective of the Biosecurity Law is to diversify CCP’s means of espionage. The Chinese government would be collecting biometric identifiers of people entering mainland China in the name of investigation. Through this, China aims at getting other countries’ DNA sequencing for both civil and military applications.
With all the biotechnology research and development activities being directly under command of Xi Jinping, there would be an increased layer of ambiguity around the activities being carried out in the biotechnology labs of China. This would enable the biotechnology labs in China to develop biological weapons covertly, in the name of genetic research and developments. The insufficient transparency of biosecurity norms, the inclusion of biosecurity in the National Security System and instructions to conduct an investigation on human genetic resources solidifies the belief that China is preparing for biological warfare.
Once enacted, the legislation would not only increase the stature of Xi Jinping for setting a new milestone in biosecurity governance but also be used to portray China’s ability to play a leading role over international biosecurity issues. It would be surprising to none, if China were preparing to launch invisible biological warfare in the ambit of the Biosecurity Law on an already pandemic-hit world, just for the sake of expanding its global influence on international politics and economy, given the well known self-centric temperament of Xi Jinping.
